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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 06/03/2011 Accident number: 661 
Accident time: 11:30 Accident Date: 15/12/2009 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 11/01/2010 
ID original source: OPS/14/01- 03 Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 06/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
standing to excavate (?) 
use of pick (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a UNMACA 
accident summary. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
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being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as more 
information becomes available. 
The summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan 
File: OPS/14/01- 03 
Date: 11th January 2010 
Subject: Investigation Report & Lessons Learned of [Demining group]/E0D-01 Demining  
Accident 
Attached please find the investigation report and Lessons Learned of Demining Accident, 
which occurred on 15 December 2009 in Choni Village, Khanabad District of Kunduz 
Province. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] E0D-01 DMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by the AMAC-NE to investigate the circumstances 
involved in the demining accident occurred to [the Victim] the Team Leader of [Demining 
group] EOD-01. The accident happened at 11:30 hrs, 15 Dec 2009 at Task # 
AF/1405/00000/MF 015 located in Choni Village, Khanabad District of Kunduz Province. 
SUMMARY: 
MF: AF/1405/00000/MF015 is agricultural land located in Choni village of Khan Abad district 
and has been recorded by LIS under the community No 1600 then polygoned by MCPA in 
2008. It is an area contaminated by anti-personnel mines. Mines were laid to this area by 
different belligerent militias during the civil war time 1993-2000, specifically during the armed 
conflicts between the Taliban and northern alliance's forces. The northern alliance planted 
mines around their military posts to protect them from being attacked by the Taliban 
According to the request received from locals on 15th Dec 2009, [Demining group] EOD-01 
was tasked by the MACCA/AMAC to clear this area. The size of minefield is 875 m2 and the 
accident happened on the first day of demining operations at this minefield. 
At 11:30 hrs on 15th Dec 2009, [the Victim]  the Team Leader of the EOD -01 was working as 
a deminer and trying to identify the actual mined area. While he was excavating on a signal 
by a pick, he hit the mine and it caused to the accident. As [the Victim] was not well prepared 
and fully dressed with PPE, he has got severe injures to face, eyes and forehead. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The investigation report indicates that [the Victim]  has used the pick which is not a standard 
excavation tool for excavating a detected signal. In addition to that, he started excavation 
from the centre of signal while as per the standard prodding/excavation drill, it should be 
started 15 centimetres back from the signal. 
Poor supervision has been recognized as a contributing factor to this accident as the team 
leader who normally has a controlling role has worked as deminer without observing the 
safety procedures. He has failed to wear PPE and also used the pick which is not a correct 




To prevent recurrence of similar accidents in the future, the following points are 
recommended to [Demining group] management: 
1) Full PPE and visors should be worn correctly at all time by demining personnel during the 
course of demining operations in the fields. 
2) The [Demining group] management should take practical steps to ensure demining 
operations are carried out in accordance to the organization's SOP and unnecessary and 
incorrect practices are avoided by ail [Demining group] personnel, 
3) Picks shall be removed entirely from all [Demining group] deminer's tool kits and/or held 
centrally at the administration area. The pick shall only be removed from the administration 
area for use on the clearance site with the direct authority of the Team Leader. [Demining 
group] shall amend its SOPs to reflect this practice and forward the amendment to MACCA 
QA Section. 
4) [Demining group] management shall provide MACCA HQ with feedback on all preventive 




Victim number: 844 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Eyes, severe Face, severe Head 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim 
was a field supervisor working in breach of basic safety rules including failing to use PPE. The 
secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the selection and 
training of field supervisors is a management responsibility. 
The Inadequate training listed under Notes refers to the excavation beginning directly on top 
of a mine while using an inappropriate tool. If a field supervisor would do this, it is likelky that 
the deminers would also. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of a good summary implies 
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that the Afghan investigators carried out a professional investigation and generated a detailed 
report that should be shared. 
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